Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts

Saturday, December 8, 2012

From the Empirical Archives: Iran and the Echo Chamber of History by Emanuel Stoakes


Iran and the Echo Chamber of History
Emanuel Stoakes
Originally Published in the June 2012 Issue of Empirical


“History” said Stephen “is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake”
James Joyce, Ulysses (1922)

The twentieth century saw unprecedented examples of organized violence directed by states against other states that increasingly caused their civilian populations to suffer on an enormous scale. The trajectory of this apparent pattern, while never constant enough to be considered predictable, saw an alarming rise in civilian deaths as a proportion of those killed during the major wars engaged in by Western powers.

The First World War produced a concentration of fatalities among soldiers conscripted to the cause of their kings and politicians, with around 4-30% of the deaths belonging to civilians (the figures vary widely depending on whether you include fatalities not caused by fighting, such as starvation). The vast scale of the atrocities of the Second World War meant that figure leapt to between 50-and 70%; in the course of the Vietnam War, the colossal violence resulted in the death toll leading to 60-80% civilian fatalities. If you include the savage bombing of Cambodia in the picture, one finds that the toll touches on the highest estimates.

It seems the pattern has not ceased to edge meander upwards. In the war in Iraq, according to some reports, up to 90% of those killed were civilians. This apparent feature of Western “progress” has run parallel to the increasing success, effectiveness, and sophistication of the public relations industry in conveying politically useful messages to an electorate. One of the results of this, it seems, is that popular opinion regarding war has become less of a decisive factor in determining the likelihood of conflict.

This was the case in the build-up to the Iraq war in Britain, where overwhelming popular opposition to the war was of little consequence; and 63% preference for a diplomatic solution opposed to war among the American public, seemed to be unheeded by the Bush administration.

Examining the picture in the wider view of history, the recourse to war by the United States and her allies has, since the days of the First World War, been a common refrain in dealing with issues of strategic importance, regardless of the body count.

“Never again,” they said soberly after that so-called “great” war of 1914-1917, a conflict that many of my British ancestral countrymen were told “would be over by Christmas” after its outbreak. In its wake, four years later, there followed the ugly realpolitik and fatal greed of the treaty of Versailles, the failure of the League of Nations, the Great Depression; the rise of Hitler; thence, the next war – with its unforgettable consequences.

That forgotten man of history, Justice Robert H. Jackson, the American judge presiding over the deep horrors of the Nuremburg trials, spoke out against wars of aggression as “the supreme international crime,”, differing from others in that it encompasses “the evil of the whole,”, referring to the responsibility of the aggressor for the conflict they started.

He also reflected, with a kind of devastating foresight, on how, by passing judgement on the Nazi atrocities for such belligerence, the victors of the Second World War were, in fact, obliged to act with distinction. 


Two key statements of this kind made by Jackson at Nuremberg should, in the opinion of this writer, be memorized by every student of American history. In prosecuting Nazi officers, most notably Goebbels, for their atrocities committed during the Second World War, Jackson poignantly declared: “our [America’s] position is that no grievances or policies will justify resort to aggressive war.” Adding that such a method of warfare “is utterly renounced and condemned as an instrument of policy.”

During the trial, Jackson, referring to the Nazi criminals he was helping to prosecute, reflected: “We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well.”

Generations later, albeit 15 years after the open wound of Vietnam had been fumblingly sealed, President George Bush, Sr. declared, without irony: “America stands where it always has, against aggression, against those who would use force to replace the rule of law.” His remarks were made on the eve of the First Gulf War, launched in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.

A mere two years prior, Iraq’s conflict with Iran had concluded; the longest conventional war of the century, borne from Baghdad’s aggression against her neighbor, justified on the most unconvincing of pretexts, and supported by the Reagan administration (with Bush’s consent).

US support for Saddam Hussein during this period was quite explicit, and very generous: the US provided Iraq with several billion dollars worth dollars’ worth of economic aid, the sale of dual-use technology, military intelligence, Special Operations training for Iraqi troops, and in some instances, provided direct military support to Iraq.

The Iran-Iraq war was launched in the same year – 1980 - that Hussein was made an honorary citizen of Detroit, and during a time when he was reciprocally generous: dispensing financial support from his vast oil wealth to American businesses, and employing lobbying groups (in this case, van Kloberg & Associates), just as Ahmed Chalabi would do before the more recent war in the gulf.

Rumsfeld, as is well known, was dispatched to Baghdad to shake hands with his future antagonist; less known is that he visited in a friendly capacity the day the UN reported that Iraq had used mustard gas and a nerve agent against Iranian troops, to discuss continued partnership between the two nations.

Years later, after the Second Gulf War launched in 2003, Saddam Hussein was captured and finally stood trial for crimes that he committed for the most part during the Iran-Iraq war. Hussein was eventually hung for the killing of 148 people in the Dujail region of Iraq in response to an assassination attempt by a local in 1982.

He was never been tried for the crimes against humanity he committed with the assistance of companies from the United States, using mustard gas to murder his own people in Halabja oin the Kurdish north of Iraq. The number killed in that incident far exceeds those killed in Dujail. It is not difficult to have suspicions why he was not held accountable for that atrocity.

Also in 1982, the White House legally removed Iraq’s status as a nation supporting terrorism, enabling Hussein to begin to, quite literally, develop weapons of mass destruction in order to better prosecute the country’s war with Iran. It also allowed for sales of chemical precursors used in chemical weapons to Hussein from US firms, with the results referred to above. Among other items sold, including a wide range of arms, were materials that were almost certainly used to construct weapons of mass destruction.

In 1984, Reagan declared a familiar sounding “war against terrorism,” and accordingly banned arms sales and, passed legislation that froze the assets of listed terrorist organizations. Meanwhile, diplomatic and military support for Saddam Hussein continued – in fact, arms sales to both sides in the Iran-Iraq war continued in order to fund terrorist groups in Nicaragua in an assault on the democratically elected government.

The highest international legal authority, the International Court of Justice, condemned American actions as constituting the “unlawful use of force” and the violation of treaties signed by the country.


The U.S response was to heighten its proxy assault on Nicaragua (aggression by any yardstick), with bipartisan support, and Jackson’s words helpfully kidnapped from mainstream media discourse on the subject. Human rights groups’ reports observed at this time that the US issued attacks on the Central American country, including direct offenses against civilian infrastructure like medical clinics and farms.

Much later, with the worst of his crimes behind him, Iraq’s alleged possession of WMDs, drove this infant century’s most bloody war yet into birth.

Returning to the end of World War Two, even as Jackson was pursuing justice to the detriment of former Nazis, American, and British post-war planning had incorporated the poison of thinly veiled aggressive war into post-war policy, and had taken some of the most ardent “poisoners” of the collapsed enemy regimes under their wing.

First the British, and then the US, backed a repressive regime in Greece that had to fight off rebellious internal resistance with extreme venality, installing a pliant ruling elite as the Allies had in post-Mussolini Italy (the Nazi sympathizer King Emmanuel and the fascist army veteran, Field Marshall Bagdolio).

Former SS intelligence figures such as Klaus Barbie, the “butcher of Lyon,” were used by the CIA to spy on post-war France in order to weed out communists. So, too, Reinhard Gehlen, who oversaw German intelligence on the Eastern Front during the war, who was re-employed by the US State Department to supervise clandestine Nazi units in their on-going, US-backed operations against Russia from within the Soviet state itself. Needless to say, immunity from prosecution for atrocities in the case of Barbie was a part of this cold war act of expediency – at least temporarily.

In 1945, in Korea, the post-liberation government was swept aside at the orders of the US, and allowed pro-Axis Japanese police a freehand to revisit their war-time oppression in order to maintain the power of an approved repressive new ruler. In the small island of Cheju near Korea, more than 30,000 rebellious citizens were killed in a crackdown on popular working-class resistance to the regime.

George Kennan, the highly influential head of State Department planning department, wrote in 1948 a document known as “Policy Planning Sstudy 23,”which explained the thinking of senior policy planners regarding such examples of post-Nuremberg foreign policy.

“We have 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its population,” he declared in the paper. “Our real task is to devise a pattern of relationships that permit us to maintain this position of disparity…We must cease to talk about vague… and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization.”

The tone of high-level discussions on foreign policy as documented in the internal record (for those that look) may have become more sophisticated since Kennan’s day, but the theme of policy planning has differed little since the aftermath of the world’s worst war.


From Iraq to Iran: looking backwards to understand the next war?

Jumping forward six decades and more, over a trail of war-wreaked human debris to, Western realpolitik and foreign policy that mock Jackson’s words, we march this year to the possibility of a bloody regional war in the Middle East directed by the US and Israel against Iran and her allies.

The last great war in the Middle East, has just “ended” next door to where this one might begin.

The doctrine of “preventative war” (even less legal according to the Geneva conventions than pre-emptive war) in the new age of terror, helped to launch the war with Iraq; at a cost to the US taxpayer of nearly one and half trillion dollars, at the very least 114,000 civilians dead, and the lives thousands of American soldiers.

A variation on the Bush doctrine of preventative war may be used to launch a war with Iran too.

Put very roughly, the weak end of the case for bombing Iran centers on the fear that an irrational nuclear armed Iran may use the bomb, regardless of the consequences. The most troubling plausible threat scenario involves terrorist acquisition of a weapon through insider infiltration of Tehran’s nuclear program.

The possibility is, of course, terrifying, but then so is the more credible threat that a drone-battered and less strategically significant Pakistan might do the same, given its far greater Islamist and Taliban presence. The notorious Pakistani scientist, A. Q. Khan, shared nuclear secrets with Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, China and Iran. He was accused of doing just this by the US in 2004 – and confessed as much.

It emerged not long after that Khan’s “nuclear” tour was in fact ordered and monitored by Pakistan’s military and government – a highly unsettling fact, albeit not well known. As popular anti-American sentiment in the country hits the roof, Pakistan remains “the most dangerous state in the world” according to prominent scholars. Accordingly, in the view of many security experts, Pakistan is the world’s greatest nuclear threat; however, it remains both un-invaded by the United States and an example of a country that has a concentration of terrorism-prone groups that have not accessed Islamabad’s weapons. Tellingly, American engagement on this issue, as with North Korea, has been incomparable with that of Tehran’s suspected nuclear program: i.e., pragmatism over jingoism.

Returning to Israeli-Iranian tensions, in the view of current Israeli Minister of Strategic affairs, Moshe Ya’alon: “Tehran should face a dilemma – whether to have a bomb or to survive” (he actually said this, just before the turn of the year).

The Jewish state’s President, Shimon Peres, in a typically more reserved style, averred that military action was looking increasingly more likely than a diplomatic solution a few weeks prior to Ya’alon’s statement. He added that the international community must do “whatever it takes” to stop the march toward the bomb.

Writing authoritatively in the Atlantic in 2010, Jeffrey Goldberg foresaw the nature of an Israeli strike against Iran’s facilities, and its consequences. His measured predictions ran as follows: Israel will “bomb the uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz, the formerly secret enrichment site at Qom, the nuclear-research center at Esfahan, and possibly even the Bushehr reactor … regardless of whether they succeed in destroying Iran’s centrifuges and warhead and missile plants, or whether they fail miserably to even make a dent in Iran’s nuclear program—they stand a good chance of changing the Middle East forever.”

Goldberg continued that the attack also could result in: “lethal reprisals…a full-blown regional war that could lead to the deaths of thousands of Israelis and Iranians, and possibly Arabs and Americans as well; of creating a crisis for Barack Obama that will dwarf Afghanistan in significance and complexity.” To which Goldberg breathlessly adds the threat of “causing the price of oil to spike to cataclysmic highs, launching the world economy into a period of turbulence not experienced since the autumn of 2008, or possibly since the oil shock of 1973”; and “of placing communities across the Jewish diaspora in mortal danger, by making them targets of Iranian-sponsored terror attacks.”

The last head of Israel’s respected intelligence services, Mossad, Meir Dagan, agrees about how high the stakes are: “I’m concerned about possible mistakes and I prefer to speak out before there is a catastrophe” he said on the Israeli television program “Uvda’ in December. “I have to assume that the level of destruction, paralysis of everyday life, and Israeli death toll would be high,” he opined.

Prior to Dagan’s statement, the serving Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, had predicted that “A [potential] war [with Iran] is no picnic, but in any scenario there won’t be 50 thousand or 5,000 or even 500 dead [Israelis]” as a result. “It’ll be over by Christmas” comes to mind.


The assessment of Iran’s military threat in popular Western media coverage since November has hinged on the findings of the most recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The New York Times reported, alarmingly, on the day following the release of the IAEA paper that the IAEA “have amassed a trove of new evidence that, they say, makes a ‘credible’ case for Iran’s nuclear ambitions.”

The New York Times article, and many parallel media reports, put many of those concerned about an Iranian bomb on heightened alert. Seymour Hersh, by contrast, pointed out in a piece in the New Yorker that many serious commentators actually did not take the IAEA report to say anything especially new, despite the super-heated coverage in the press.

He records the statements of Robert Kelley, former director of the IAEA and veteran expert in the field who found nothing novel in the latest publication on Iran. Kelley remarked that most of the information was simply “old news,”, that most informed journalists were already aware of, adding,: “I wonder why this same stuff is now considered ‘new information’ by the same reporters.”

Kelley’s insights did not stop there. Having read the report carefully, he concluded that hundreds of pages of material [referred to in the report] appears to come from a single source: a laptop computer, allegedly supplied to the I.A.E.A. by a Western intelligence agency, whose provenance could not be established [the summary is Hersh’s].”

From that perspective, the IAEA report may not have, in fact, provided solid grounds to be building the case for an attack on Iran; one that could qualify as a breach of international law if undertaken with serious question marks still hanging in the air, the consequences of which would be almost certain to lead to violent retaliation by Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah.


What is also interesting to note is how the tone of the report differs significantly to others produced by the former director of the IAEA – currently one of Egypt’s leading political lights, ElBaradei. While ElBaradei was concerned about the situation, his reactions were measured and his reputation was (outside of Washington) formidable – testified to by his Nobel pPrize inof 2005. The newly - inaugurated director, ElBaradei’s replacement, with close ties to the US, was (and is) Yukiya Amano, who was described, in his former capacity at the IAEA, by an internal US diplomatic memo in 2009 as being “solidly in the U.S. court on every strategic decision, from high-level personnel appointments to the handling of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program.”

The conclusion that Hersh came to after investigating his New Yorker piece was that the IAEA paper was a “political document.”

In a forthright and candid interview on Democracy Now in mid-winter, Hersh’s views were amplified: the build-up to war is being prepared as “almost the same sort of, I don’t know if you want to call it
a ‘psychosis,’ but it’s some sort of a fantasy land being built up here, as it was with Iraq.”

Despite the insights of Goldberg, Dagan, Kelley, Hersh and numerous others, there appears to still be a great deal of political will in Washington to lubricate the wheels of Congress for a collision course with Tehran. Under a bill led by Senator Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, US diplomacy with Iran may be effectively criminalizsed – it has, at the time of writing, passed the House of Representatives; Santorum, Romney, Gingrich all gesture at a strike, while the embattled President Obama prevaricates.


One fact that has to be remembered above all in this dilemma that senior political and military figures in both Israel and America frankly acknowledge: that targeted strikes would only delay Iran’s nuclear capacity, not destroy it. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta admitted this in November. This leads to the obvious thought: if Iran’s nuclear facilities are bombed and its nuclear capacity is not annihilated, only delayed,- surely, Iran will only develop such bombs in earnest after any attack. And if Ms. Ros-Lehtinen has her way, Congress can’t even talk to Tehran without bureaucratic delay and great difficulty.

This being so, the legacy of the last preventative war, in Iraq, bears revisiting; just as the US presence there dwindles: 100,000 civilians dead, several thousand American troops, and a cost to the taxpayer of 1.5 trillion dollars, all counted.

In order to exorcise the horrors of Vietnam and Iraq, in order not to create new scars on our infant century, may I posit that a Jacksonian form of American exceptionalism is called for, and not a return to the Kennan or Bush 43 doctrines: rather, an exercise of distinction by way of no recourse to aggression except under strict circumstances, and by committing to rule of international law.

Understanding what aggression means in the Nuremberg-era mindset is not difficult. The Victorian-era “Caroline test” was reaffirmed by Nuremberg trials as the criteria by which pre-emptive war must be judged as legitimate. The Caroline rule declared that the necessity for preemptive self–defense must be “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”

An attack on Iran, self-evidently, does not fit these criteria. If the US does not make the strike, and Israel acts unilaterally, the responsibility for the “evil of the whole” consequential aftermath arguably will have been wrought by the incaution of Netanyahu, Ya’alon or Barak. And incaution, chillingly resembling Iraq, it most certainly is if you take the insights of leading Israeli security figures seriously, who bemoan Israel’s lack of planning for post-war scenarios – other than to maintain their belligerent stance.

Nonetheless, the US and her allies will be almost certain to rush to defend the Jewish state, itself likely to face an assault from neighbors that it could not possibly do anything but respond to, further deepening any crisis. There is even the possibility that Russia and China may get involved, with highly unpredictable consequences. Russian realpolitik and self-service over Syria, highlighted by its blocking of UN Security Council resolutions and the on-going sale of arms to Assad’s butchers, indicate that Moscow are is not afraid to take controversial, indeed shameless, stances on Middle-Eastern issues.

Such a war, against a military power not only far superior to Saddam’s sanction-crushed army, but the main sponsor of the Iraqi insurgency and against the howling lessons of history will bear forth new nightmares to tackle at a time when the threat of (just about) preventable future environmental catastrophe and raging economic instability already burden the world.


With the stakes so high, with recent history so instructively nightmarish, I recall a conversation it was my honor to have with perhaps the greatest living war journalist in the world, Robert Fisk, on the nature of war. His reflection, like Jackson’s historic observation, was piercing and offers an insight into why our political representatives may play the “war card” so reflexively in moments of crisis.

Recalling how few of the modern American and British politicians responsible for Iraq had seen combat, he lamented that the resulting disconnect with the results of their decisions created a wholly false relationship with the prospect of conflict: “Instead of seeing war as what it is – the complete failure of the human spirit … it becomes a policy option.”

In the post-9/11 era, with the trainwrecked, intellectually-dishonest, rhetoric of the “war on terror” behind us, should a war with Iran–if it indeed it comes– launched on the basis of anticipatory self-defense, be acceptable without every attempt to avoid the possibility already exhausted?

If a war occurs in this manner, no doubt we will cry “never again!” from the depths of our souls as we survey its harrowed victims from this side of the reality of war. But to say this in such circumstances, surely can be forgiven only if, in doing so, we are unaware  of how we mock the past, ourselves, future generations, and the tortured human spirit.




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Monday, November 12, 2012

From the Empirical Archives: The Arab Spring


The Arab Spring
Emanuel Stoakes
Oringially Published in Empirical's May 2012 Issue

It started in Tunisia. A poor street vendor in his mid-twenties, humiliated, assaulted and suffering the confiscation of his wares at the hand of the police, sought help from the mayor of his city. Finding that the mayor was apparently not interested in his complaint, the young man who, according to the account of family members had suffered police abuse many times before, set himself alight in protest. He is said to have cried out “how do you expect me to make a living?” before his public self-immolation, visible to the busy traffic in the center of the small town, Sidi Bouzid.

Within weeks he would die from his wounds; before that he would have also helped, intentionally or not, to stir into life a movement whose consequences were as unforeseeable and striking as its coming was unexpected.

The Arab Spring was, and is, by all accounts an organic, authentically “grass roots” movement whose influence is like that of Lech Walesa’s Solidarity in Poland during the twilight of European communism. 

The comparison is both apt and misleading: the contagious influence of the democracy-seeking uprising has moved with what seemed like an irresistible momentum and popularity that panicked local autocrats into either immediate promises of moderation or brutal crackdowns. However, Walesa’s highly organized movement changed Poland after nine long, hard fought years of struggle. The late Muhammad Bouazizi and his accidental revolution changed Tunisia in weeks, and swept over much of the Arab world soon after. The comparison with Poland does not bear out in full for many other reasons. Reasons that are under-reported, shameful, and that involve us.

One of them is that this time we were not exactly on the side of democracy. The Arab Spring affected not just one nation but a whole sub-sphere of countries that are aligned by way of religion and, largely, by autocratic strangulation that the ostensibly liberty-promoting West has long colluded in.

This happens to be uncontroversial. It is a matter of fact. For years, Tunisia sat under the weight of its vain, pro-Western, self-serving dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who had replaced an ailing and long-serving reformist predecessor in 1987. His accession, which led to the beguilingly-titled “velvet revolution” was supported by European powers, as they explicitly admitted. In 1999 Fulvio Martini, former head of Italian military secret service SISMI, admitted to a parliamentary committee that “in 1985–1987 we organized a kind of golpe [Italian for “putsch”] in Tunisia, putting president Ben Ali as head of state, replacing Bourguiba who wanted to flee.”

Bourguiba did not necessarily want to flee. In fact, although he was in poor health, he was “helped” out of office by a man who pushed for his impeachment on medical grounds in an effective coup d’état. “President-for-life” Bourguiba was replaced by a politician who tried to cling on to power as long as possible and made it to nearly half the way of his predecessor’s thirty-year term.

Tunisia under Ben Ali became what an internal US diplomatic document released by Wikileaks describes as “a police state, with little freedom of expression or association, and serious human rights problems.” This was in July 2009; the cable also acknowledges the concerted efforts of a persecuted pro-democracy movement in the country, at first glance indicating Washington’s sympathies. Not so. Despite the (accurate) insights of the memo, the US had maintained ties to the pro-US regime of Ben Ali and even sent military aid just as the movement for democracy began to spread across the country, during the birth pangs of the Arab Spring.

Stephen Zunes of Foreign Policy in Focus wrote in January 2011 of US policy toward Tunisia: “Congress weighed in with support of the regime by passing a budget resolution that included $12 million in security assistance to Tunisia, one of only five foreign governments . . . [that] provided direct taxpayer-funded military aid.”

Just to clarify: the largely non-violent, pro-democracy, anti-corruption protests in Tunisia, which were met in those early days by violent suppression, were not supported by Congress. Instead, military aid was dispatched to the oppressors. Around this time, Hillary Clinton told the world that the US “was not taking sides,” despite the tell-tale funding.

The money sent to Ben Ali, although instructive, is a bagatelle (less than 1%) compared with the aid that was directed toward Tunisia’s regional big brother, Egypt, the nation of Tahrir Square. US support for Egypt’s ex-ruler Hosni Mubarak, ousted by an unprecedented display of massive public discontent and solidarity, was a constant fixture for decades, as internal memos candidly acknowledge: the purpose being to defend Israel’s security (pragmatic) and to maintain US access to the Suez Canal (strategic).

The US had been a party to the maintenance of the corrupt power of Mubarak, acting as a singularly important insurer of the regime’s viability. The planes that flew over Tahrir Square, representing a military force on the wrong side of democracy, were made in America and sold by American companies to a brutal dictator who had a record of torturing and killing his own people. This is a fact that the State Department knew perfectly well. 

The British and other European partners colluded in this as they do with the regime in Saudi Arabia: a place where torture goes unpunished if it is done by the right family, and where Uganda’s late leader Idi Amin, and now Tunisia’s Ben Ali, have tasted sanctuary due to the generosity of the same. The cries of “Ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam!” (“The people want to bring down the regime!”) were fatally silenced in Bahrain with UK-made arms and vehicles, with the support of the ruling House of Saud. Not a word of serious or high-profile protest from Washington or London on that matter.


As for Libya, and there can be no doubt that the NATO forces that intervened in the country’s civil war far exceeded the mandate granted them by UN Resolution 1973, Gaddafi’s removal was a messy affair. That he was a man guilty of crimes against humanity is not remotely contestable.

A significant but under-reported example of this surfaced in March this year, after an international tribunal on crimes committed during civil war in Sierra Leone was concluded. In the opinion of the chief prosecutor, David Crane, a senior international lawyer, Gaddafi should have been held responsible for crimes against humanity along with the former ruler of Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor. Crane told The Times of London that moves to prosecute Gaddafi had been initiated, given that he “was ultimately responsible for the mutilation, maiming and/or murder of 1.2 million people” in the war in question.

Unfortunately, any such attempts to do so were prevented by the governments of the United States and the UK, a story virtually effaced from world news at the time. When asked why this happened, Crane’s reply to The Times was terse: “Welcome to the world of oil.” Crane may or not may not be right in his assertion, but the fact remains that the prosecution’s attempts were blocked. This is likely due to the fact that Gaddafi was undergoing a period of détente with Western nations at that time, and a number of major energy companies were operating in the country. It is true that, on the positive side, Western leaders such as Obama, Cameron, and Sarkozy have all praised the democratic gains of the Arab Spring and pledged support. Time will test the substance of their words.

For the people of Tunisia, Egypt, and post-Gaddafi Libya, now comes the hard part: the flood of challenges faced by nascent democracies in the third and “second” world. In Egypt the people remain dispossessed of the power to act by themselves, even en masse, against the mountainous strength of the armed forces. Although supportive of the revolution, the military leaders do not appear to want to lose power after it. What sociologists refer to as the “monopoly of violence” or crude power still lies with that ethically ambiguous institution, and is unlikely to be seriously threatened by future leaders.

Elsewhere in North Africa, Libya-the-liberated has to rebuild Sirte and other cities, which have been devastated in parts to a likeness of Europe in 1945, but that is a relatively minor challenge. If the National Transitional Council can hold firm to their promise of constitutional reforms and genuinely democratic elections, Tunisia’s future looks set for democracy to become established. 

But there are many shades of democracy, and some of them are simply shadows cast on a cave wall. Merely holding monitored elections does not ensure that corruption, nepotism, and foreign interference will not intrude on the new territory, thereby sidelining the interests of the average Tunisian.

The risk of the latter is not small. There are a number of reasons. The post-Gaddafi political power gained from the “people’s revolution” is being handed over to an elite, who are likely to establish themselves as leading candidates for future elections, if historical precedents are anything to go by. It should not be forgotten that the Chairman of the National Transitional Council (NTC), Mustafa Abdul Jalil, used to be the justice minister in Gaddafi’s government. He can be tied to a wide swathe of crimes committed against the Libyan people in this role, even if he was just following orders.

What’s more, the French newspaper Liberation reported that the rebels made overtures to France just two weeks into the civil war, requesting support for their campaign in return for a guarantee of 35% of the nation’s oil when liberated. The evidence for this is contained in a letter allegedly written to the Emir of Qatar by members of the NTC. Reuters reported that it “saw a copy of the letter,” written in Arabic, which states that the interim government’s information minister Mahmoud Shammam had authorized a deal with France.

The evidence has been described as a fake by Shammam, and denied by the French government, but some, including the prominent journalist John Pilger, believe its authenticity. Pilger cited the letter as one of many articles of “evidence for what the thing really is.” Whether or not it is the case that a deal was done, corporate interest in Africa’s most oil-rich nation is high, and all but the most naïve must realize that this will have political consequences.

The view of leading business insiders such as Emad Mostaque, a senior strategist from panies are desperate to position themselves. Talking to Reuters in August, Mostaque stated: “Libya is a fantastically wealthy country that doesn’t need foreign money but foreign expertise. This could be the start of an experiment in hydrocarbon-fueled capitalism with a lot of money up for grabs.”

Libya’s resource wealth was outlined neatly by The Washington Post in an article on June 11th this year: “Libya has some of the biggest and most proven oil reserves—43.6 billion barrels—outside Saudi Arabia, and some of the best drilling prospects.”

Indicative of what may be to come, Britain’s trade and investment council are already in Tripoli. Shell and BP’s shares rose on the news that the firms were talking to the transitional government.

In Iraq, not too long ago, foreign influence weighed heavily into hydrocarbon laws receptive to foreign direct investment (FDI). In addition, the very constitution of the newly liberated country was written in a handful of months, with the real work done by four political figures all with ties to Washington in five weeks, sometimes discussing the binding central document in the air-conditioned confines of Baghdad’s US embassy.

As one Iraqi contributor to the official constitution drafting committee, Mahmoud Othman reflected (in a Washington Post article published on August 13, 2005), “The Americans say that they didn’t intervene, but they intervened deep.” Othman claimed that the US helpfully “gave us a detailed proposal, almost a full version of a constitution” to work from during the draft sessions, a statement that sits uneasily with the image of the US as the steward of free democracies.

But Libya is not Iraq, and constitutions can be amended. What are much harder to change are the details of oil contracts that may be hastily signed on terms favorable to foreign investors.

The most popular of these is the “Production Sharing Agreement,” or PSA. PSAs are agreements “in which the corporation provides capital investment” in return for “control over an oilfield, and access to a large share of the revenues from it” according to the oil-industry monitor, Platform.

PSAs routinely have clauses that fix a company’s involvement in a nation for forty years or more—sometimes indefinitely. They often force the government to protect the profits of the company against any future changes of law or adverse circumstances. Unless Libya has a referendum on this individual issue, a deal granted by a PSA might be agreed to without public consent, betraying the ghost of fair play and democracy that the rebels project.

There are a host of other issues to confront. As Phyllis Bennis wrote in Salon not long after Gaddafi’s death, “the challenge facing post-Gaddafi Libya is daunting.” She went on to indicate that already existing divisions are beginning to become painfully apparent and need addressing: “Rifts between east and west have amplified, with the. . . NTC widely distrusted in other areas of the country.” She added, “They have already had difficulty setting up shop in Tripoli, where anger remains at the disproportional Benghazi/Eastern Libya representation.”

The risk of internal tensions, even a second civil war, remains a possibility in Libya, where now, according to Russia Today, “The country remains dotted with the posts of militia forces who are refusing to lay down their arms.”

Finally, a serious human rights issue is constituted by the plight of non-Arabs in Tunisia, especially sub-Saharan Africans who are subjected to pockets of racist violence and the suspicion of being former members of Gaddafi’s mercenary forces. While it is true that militias from elsewhere in Africa were hired by the dictator prior to and during the war, many innocent people have been and continue to be threatened by extra-judicial violence based on the political implications of their skin color. Little is being done to prevent the attacks.

Despite all of the above, the Arab Spring remains a miracle of recent history. The fact of its emergence and–crucially–its eventual success in ousting dictators in three key countries in the Muslim world, demonstrated to the world that popular movements can actually change things. It showed that a lot of people exercising their collective strength can touch the untouchables.

Furthermore, it killed off a number of ghosts. The non-violence, dignity, and immense courage of protestors facing down the armed might of dictators exploded certain “war on terror” caricatures of Muslims that have obsessed the Western media. The millions in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Syria and elsewhere suddenly replaced images of grim-faced terror suspects, Hamas suicide bombers, or that famous evil man with the beard on Al Jazeera.

How overdue it was. Bin Laden’s death could not have come at a more epochal and appropriate moment: his brand of extreme political Islam was made utterly irrelevant in the era of Tahrir Square. Al Qaeda leaders struggled to respond, coming out in favor of endorsing the uprisings, but their voices were insignificant.

Events like these offer hope, but also offer the potential for crashing disappointment if their potential is not fulfilled. Western governments, if they can see beyond their purely selfish interests, have a unique opportunity to be partners in a democracy-founding project that could signal a sea-change in our
relations with the region.

In Libya we can, for example, use our influence to enforce the protection of the human rights of indigenous Africans suffering in the country, and to avoid a second round of civil war. If we are set on making money out of the country, we can at least try to create decently paid jobs for Libyans. A great deal of the power to achieve this rests in the hands of the interim governments of the newly liberated nations, including their capacity to resist the multitude of temptations that will be thrown their way by interested actors. They have a difficult task, and they do need help from the Western powers. But if they are to take history seriously, they have no reason to make approbatory gestures without exercising the caution of the less deceived.


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Thursday, November 1, 2012

The November Issue


Have you seen the November 2012 issue yet? 

Here is the Letter from the Editors to acquaint you to our mission and purpose of the magazine. 

For those of you who are new to Empirical magazine, we want to emphasize, as we have in previous issues, that we believe a new sense of the term "empirical" is required as we move forward in the twenty-first century. Unlike the purely physical, sense-based empiricism that was the darling of the old twentieth century positivism, we embrace the type of "radical empiricism" that was promoted by William James and Alfred North Whitehead. (It was James who actually coined the term.) 

The death knell to the old positivistic approach was actually sounded as early as the seventeenth century by the Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume, who knew that on this basis, neither practical life nor science as most people think of it-i.e., an inquiry into the truth-were possible. On the basis of sense impressions alone, we cannot know there is such a thing as causation, a foundational principle to science and practical life. Nor can we know that there are bodies, minds (other than our own), or even a world outside of our thoughts. George Santayana pointed out that the problem was really worse than Hume had imagined, saying that on Hume's view, we're caught in a "solipsism of the present moment," where all we know is what we're sensing right now in any given moment. We cannot know that we even have continuity of our own minds from one second to the other. But even bad ideas sometimes have their value and have to play themselves out before they're roundly rejected. 

Science went on about its business as if Hume had never come to his skeptical conclusions. Especially within the realm of Newtonian physics, this materialistic approach had real value. Then, with the advent of electromagnetic, relativity, and quantum theories, everything changed. 

Nineteenth-century idealists had offered another model for thinking of our relationship to the world by suggesting that we are ourselves individual minds that are an extension of an original and universal mind. But using this theory, philosophers paid little attention to science. 

James and Whitehead, however, scientists themselves, sought another path. They offered a radical form of empiricism that embraces science and its central principle that our beliefs should stand up to tests in the world of experience. But the idea of experience should not be limited to mere sense impressions (narrowly defined as the data that comes to us through the five physical sense organs). Memory, for example, is an inheritance of experience from one moment to the next that does not come to us through the five physical senses. Feelings of the "withness of the body," as Whitehead termed this feeling of the experiences of our own bodies, are other examples of experience beyond that given by the five physical senses. Experience, it turns out upon deeper reflection, has a much broader basis than earlier empiricists had thought. 

As is often the case, there were ulterior motives that drove many materialists to insist, despite the evidence available to them, that we should restrict ourselves to the five physical senses. One reason was that they wanted to distinguish themselves as better truth-finders than those who worked in the much greyer areas of the humanities, including religion. This approach worked well within the realm of Newtonian mechanics, but has not worked so well when applied to the more complex relationships of quantum mechanics, biology, and human psychology. 

One of the positive ramifications of a radically empirical approach to understanding our world, therefore, is that the humanities, including religion and spirituality, is brought back to the table of discussion with the sciences. Empiricalmagazine honors this radically empirical tradition, in part, by bringing together the voices of artists, scientists, philosophers, theologians, Buddhist writers, psychologists, social workers, architects, short-story writers, poets, photographers, and many others. The truth is too complex for any one, finite approach to have the one and only answer. All of life is a call to be open to the many voices of experience. We learn from those voices. We develop a better-rounded worldview through being open and sincerely listening to those voices. 

In the November 2012 issue of Empirical, you will again find a wide range of voices reflecting the experiences of our age. We are honored to include in our pages, for the first time, the voice of award-winning economist and author Herman Daly. He has written something that should have appeal to both ends of the political spectrum-an idea for ending the Federal Reserve Bank and the International Monetary Fund in one fell swoop. His idea involves "Nationalizing Money" as the title tells us, thereby taking the power of printing money away from the Fed and putting this power into the hands of elected officials who should be held accountable by the electorate. 

Investigative journalist Emanuel Stoakes brings us a reflective update on the war in Syria, and he includes some background on how the problems arose in the first place. 

Randall Auxier builds off of a Machiavellian theme as he discusses "Three Kinds of Soldiers." In particular, he relates this discussion to the highly debated death of an officer in the US Army, Colonel Ted West­husing. Auxier does not so much present a case for or against the official story that Westhusing's death in Iraq was a suicide, as he uses the occasion of this honorable man's death to discuss the relationship of ethics to soldiering, and more particularly, the relationship of ethics to aspects of the Iraq War. 

Historian Mustafah Dhada looks at the rise of neoconservativism in the US, and asks "America: Have We Crossed the Rubicon?" Dhada, who himself contributed to the constitution of his native Mozambique, challenges us through a suggestive inquiry into whether the US Constitution has been circumvented in a range of areas including elections, the censorship and control of media, and corporate influence over our elected officials. 

In the realm of religious thought for this issue, philosopher and theologian John B. Cobb Jr., co-founder of the Center for Process Studies in Claremont, California, (along with David Ray Griffin), has written "Good Idols and Bad." While noting that some people may have moved beyond idols entirely, as they claim, idols still serve an important role in religious people's lives around the world. Some of these idols, he suggests, are better for us than others. Drawing from his role in Christian-Buddhist dialogue, Cobb points to ways that the Christ idol is sometimes misrespresented and put to harmful uses, but argues that this need not be the case. In an age dominated by the idol of money, Cobb urges us to reconsider the liberating power of discovering the Christ within, comparing this to the Buddhist idea of discovering the Buddha Nature within. 

Scott Bontz, who works at the Land Institute in Salina, Kansas, has contributed an article on the Land Institute's work with the development of perennial crops. His article helps us to understand the connections between annual crops and soil erosion, and helps us to appreciate the fragile nature of the good top soil we need for farming. 

Ian Dees reports on a new religion called Kopimi. Dees helps us understand that the Kopimists, emerging in this high tech era, have strongly held ethical views that at first may seem counterintuitive. They argue for the free distribution of information around the globe, and against copyright protections. Dees helps us see the ways in which copyright protection law sometimes does not serve the public interest, and is often unreasonable. 

Rounding out this issue, we have an article in the arts by Richard Jones on the Canadian actress and director Tara Browne, whose Diversity Face Films puts a spotlight on diversity issues. As Jones tells us, "with seven ethnic streams jockeying for position in her DNA-Austrian, British, Scottish, Hawaiian, Philippine, Spanish, Chinese-she could hardly avoid the mantle of diversity." We also have an "NBA Preview" by our own Empirical Senior Editor, Dan O'Brien, and recipes from Sandra Stoakes and our Editor-in-Chief, Tara Grover Smith. 

As usual, we bring you the best in fiction and poetry, too. This month, Finn Kraemer has provided us with a compelling short story about a father and son on a hunting trip called "In My Father's Silence." We have poems on "Cycling" by Travis Laurence Naught, and "What I'd Ban," and "Molar" by Carol V. Davis. Last but not least, you will find the beautiful photography you've come to expect and enjoy from photographers around the globe. 

Have you subscribed yet to ensure you haven't missed a single issue? One of our fans says:

I've been looking for a magazine with this kind of range and diversity for a long time. Until Empirical came along, I could only find magazines that either had a fairly narrow focus in their own specialist field, or else felt random and directionless. Your focus on radical empiricism (an approach I share) as the "connecting theme" gives it a great focus without limiting the scope at all. 

--Simo Sakari Aaltonen, subscriber from Finland





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Tuesday, October 23, 2012

Getting to Know Empirical


We here at Empirical are proud of the quality magazine we produce every month, despite pillars of the publishing community, like Newsweek, deciding to go digital. We believe that having a physical copy in hand is the very essence of what sets us apart from other magazines. Empirical is going to be increasing its efforts over the next couple of months to bring you multimedia and social networking opportunities to interact and learn more about the magazine. 

If you have read the magazine, please share your impressions with your friends and family to help grow the Empirical community. If you have not had read our wonderful magazine yet, then stop reading this post and go out and get a copy. (You can visit us at http://www.empiricalmagazine.com/ to find out how to subscribe to the publication or purchase single copies.) 

Additionally, if you really loved our magazine, we would love to see user videos (no more than a minute or two) describing what about the issue resonated with you. We are going to be compiling these types of video clips over the next couple of months to add to the Empirical YouTube channel, which is coming soon to a laptop near you. 

To further acquaint yourself with the magazine, we have been providing posts about some of the quality works that we have published in Empirical. Please take a moment to read them when you have the time. 



Friday, July 27, 2012

"Iran: And What to Do About It" by Mustafah Dhada

Why is Iran so anti-Western? How does it see itself as a power in the region? These questions should ideally prove easier to tackle in two historical contexts: its distant past as a former Shiite empire, and its near recent neo-colonial past that severely undermined its sovereignty.

Kaluts Desert, Iran. PHOTO: yeowatzup




Iran began the 20th century as a secular state under the Pahlavi rule, a rule that saw unrest as its politicians, civil society leaders, and intellectuals grappled with shape-shifting searches for a post-neocolonial identity. In the process, a plethora of political activists and parties proliferated, leading savvy visionary leaders to seek coalitions, and form alliances to address Iranian self-determination. For Iranian politicians and political activists steeped in social reforms and social consciousness-raising it really did not matter who adhered to what ideology. As long they were united to tackle the task ahead, to liberate themselves from intrusive tyranny, that is all that mattered.

Note that Iran had had at least two long imperial reigns. The first period was brought to its knees by the Macedonians, under Alexander. The second more in the recent past had enabled Iran to re-craft its destiny and leadership in the region as an alternative force to three forms of Islam: Saudi Arabian Sunni Islam under the pre and then post-Wahhabist period, Sufi-based contemplative Sunni Islam from the Ottomans, and a broader swath of Sunni congregationalists elsewhere. That Shiite leadership role ended with Russian and British dominance in the region, crippling Iranian economy after the First World War. By 1940s Iran had been economically re-engineered to fuel Western needs (mostly British) for oil.

To the Russians, Iranian nationalist coalition with Iranian communist party and activists served its interests well during the forties and early fifties. They could through such an alliance expand their influence into the rest of Iran using Azerbaijan as a communist stronghold, and eventually reach the Persian Gulf – a warm port. To the British, the prospect of Russians perilously close to its oil wells, and infrastructure proved alarming, posing a real threat to its flow of revenues, gushing almost literally, from Iranian soil.

The nationalists inside Iran, saw the external powers as singularly insensitive, exploitative, and uncompromisingly inflexible in the face of their own desires for meaningful self-determination. It was in this context that Mossadeq rose to power! As we know, his government took unilateral action on oil and related issues – leaving the British with little choice but one. They gerrymandered sanctions on Iran using its powerful seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In addition, Britain was nearly poor at the end of the World War II. Yes, it had won the war. Hitler was defeated – but in large part that was accomplished with American money, American power, and American political will. Britain has borrowed heavily form colonial and other imperial coffers to finance its warring enterprise in Europe.

To the Americans, the alliance with communists, and the alignment between nationalists and their cohorts in Azerbaijan and elsewhere in Tehran was yet another manifestation of Soviet empire building – and a good reason to nip it in the bud. Politically then, British and American interests coincided here. In terms of energy needs however, they did not.

In the meantime, America was on its second catapulting stage of consolidated rise as a global power, and its fuel needs were on the rise. Britain was economically weak. It could hardly dictate its own terms to resolve the nationalization crisis in Iran. America could. Its intervention there could once and for all, stem the tide of Russian march to the south, and enable Britain to extricate from Iran and save face in return for a forty percent share in the oil revenue. Further, it would introduce the United States into the Middle East directly as a major player. The pawn in all of this was – Iran.

Its democratically elected government had to go. It was replaced with a US – backed regime that would guarantee US tenure in Tehran for some time to come. To ensure the latter was accomplished, the US tied some of the Iran’s revenue to imports of military hardware; and ensured that the new regime publicly stated its neutrality over Israeli conflicts with its neighbors, and over Palestine which was about to be a hotly contested terrain. Little wonder then that today Iran views the United States as it does – a malevolent power with little to offer Iran and its people as a sovereign nation state!

Secondly, Iran as an Islamic Shiite republic has roots that stemmed from its immediate pro-American past and went deeper still to both its Islamic and pre-Islamic history. Mention was made earlier of the Iranian pre-Islamic imperial past. That past gave us the first ever bill of human rights recorded on baked clay adorning a cylinder, shaped like a djembe. The artifact sat on display in the British Museum ever since it was brought from Iran where it was originally found among ruins from the reign of Cyrus. That past hid several other gems – Zoroastrian monotheism, abolition of slavery, 1700 miles of freeways, a highly developed regional governorship, poetry as discourse, oral historiography, and architecture. This text of the imperial past is kept alive even today, by specially trained oral historians, by authors in historically inspired poetic narratives, by puppet masters, and by travelling cultural emissaries.

Islam once introduced in Iran tapped into this institutional and instructional richness, capitalizing on these to promulgate the new faith. The experiment proved a resounding success, so much so that the Iranian aristocracy, politicians, patricians, bureaucrats, and diplomats at one point dominated the Abbasid caliphate before the Mongols destroyed Baghdad in the 13th century. The American-backed regime under Reza Shah negated Iran’s Islamic past while attempting to craft its legitimacy to a Zoroastrian-based past under a new militarized modernity, a la Ataturk!

What the Shah regime failed to understand was that his opponents and the clergy saw him as an American backed usurper to the Pahlavi throne; and that the old pre-Islamic priestly class had not disappeared. In fact, the latter had proved to be a resilient historical force, highly adaptive to tumultuous and sudden changes in Iranian history. In this case, it had re-invented itself some centuries earlier to embrace the new faith, an equally monotheistic faith!

Under the Shah, they sat languishing at the margins, simmering under pressing economic conditions. The Shah’s reforms had failed to bring a deeper structural transformation of society in Iran. In fact, it had strengthened corruption and cronyism. It had forced the religious leaders back behind the portals of mosques and madrassas. Eventually, the two margins of society, the disfranchised and the clergy found a common cause behind which to rally. The Shah in the meantime had exiled clerics and other leaders overseas. There they sought to craft and re-craft a vision of a new Islamic republic under Shiite leadership. It was only a matter of time for a Mossadeq-like revolt to ignite Iran.

When the mid-1970s unrest flared, the clergy this time stood uncompromisingly firm. The Shah and all influences that had enabled him to govern over Iran had to go – and that meant the US in and around Tehran. By the time Khomeini returned in 1978/79 to lead the country spiritually, he had already refined his blue print to guide Iranian politicians and the political process towards an Islamic Republic.

The new republic therefore, saw itself as a new hope for the Muslim world. It was to right a past, a past that even the Abbasids had failed to maintain beyond the Muttawakil era. It was going to finally supplant the Ottomans and their heirs who ruled an empire but failed to provide a firm and clearly defined theologically inspired, as opposed to Sufi-inspired, leadership to the Ummah. Finally, the new Iran was going to show the way for others to combat hegemony.

As such they challenged an US backed Saudi Arabian Wahabism riddled with contradictions and corruption. They vowed to reverse the Shah’s neutrality towards what they saw as an US “province”, namely Israel. They declared their support of anti-Israeli and anti-American influences in the region through a variety of measures, from financing Hezbollah activists directly and through the Hawala system, to achieving nuclear weaponry to be at pares inter pares at it were with America. At least that was the original vision!

Today, we stand at loggerheads with Iran. We sabre rattle with threats of preemptive strike directly, or via a proxy. Israel stands button-poised to do it for us! In the end neither measure will work. All it will do is to remind Iran that for them the politics of the Cold War is not over yet. They were once invaded, taken over, and ruled for quarter of a century by an American-backed Satrap disguised as a Shah. If they are not careful this time over compliance on nuclear technology, they could witness another long debacle with foreign-baked rule.

It is time to bring Iran in from the cold. As it is, with the removal of Saddam under false pretenses, we created a leadership vacuum below Baghdad. Under Saddam, the southern region kissing the fringes of the western marshland had kept in check the Shiites and its leadership. The war with Iran had further cemented this Ba’athist’s highly secular view of a nationalist Iraq. Under him, it had little room for religious sectarians to play a role in his politics. The Iranians knew this. The Shiite in southern Iraq knew it too. They could push the envelop of political religiosity to a point – and no more. As long as they confined to sentimental and occasionally intense expression of Shiite martyrdom and annual pilgrimage to holy sites in the south, they were largely left alone, with periodic and violent reminders to eschew anti-Saddam politics.

With Saddam’s removal all hell or prospects of Shiite heaven broke lose! The vacuum was rapidly filled with Tehran-backed Iraqi Shiite leaders vying for prominence in the new US backed Iraq. In effect, what we see is a trifurcated Iraq. The Sunnis marginally hold on to the Iraqi midriff. The area above the midriff is squelched by the self-governing Kurds. The Shiite south is now on an osmotic rise to political power, making a national unity government in Iraq a dollar-backed American fiction. In fact, “the mission accomplished” results are in: Iraq has reverted to a de facto Ottoman province at the cusp of the First World War. There is no going back.

Let us recognize this. I wonder if we should not invite Iran to the table and in the process recognize it as a prospective power in the region. Should we in the West consider facilitating a post- CENTO regional security force with Iranian, Kurdish, Turkish, Egyptian and Saudi Arabian contingents? Syrians too could be invited, once the dust settles down north of Damascus. Their task would be to take over when the US and the NATO leave the region and then draft a regional security agenda. I wonder if a measure akin to this will not blunt the edges of Iranian antagonism while restoring power to those who live, love, and die in the region and call it their own? Here I am reminded of what Salahuddin, the Kurdish-born Muslim commander, and chevalier said to his Crusader opponents over occupied Jerusalem. Something to the effect that, “please know that you are from overseas. You will leave eventually. We will be here.”