Showing posts with label Gar Alperovitz. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gar Alperovitz. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 10, 2013

From the Empirical Archives: Democracy: From the Ground Up by Gar Alperovitz

Democracy: From the Ground Up
Gar Alperovitz
Originally published in the January 2013 issue of Empirical



What of the central question of democracy itself ? Many have noted the trends of failing belief, the radical decline in voting, the massive role of money and corporate influence in lobbying, media, and elections–and in general, the large numbers who surveys show feel that “our national experiment in self-government is faltering.” That millions of Americans believe “people like me have almost no say in the political system” has been a wake-up call for many on the left, right, and center.

Several lines of reassessment have become increasingly important as the crisis has deepened. The first, directed to foundational “grassroots” community issues, has come into ever more sharply defined focus in recent years. The work of Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam kicked off a major debate on one aspect of the problem. Putnam probed well beneath such surface-level issues as the fall-off in voting to focus instead on local citizen associations, networks, formal and informal clubs, neighborhood groups, unions, and the like. Large numbers of Americans, he suggested, were now both actually and metaphorically “bowling alone” rather than in association with others. Putnam suggested that a decline in associational activity, in turn, had produced a decline in trust and “social capital”–foundational requirements of democracy in general. His response was straightforward: the nation should develop as many ways as possible to encourage local involvement–the only way, he held, Americans could hope to renew the basis of democracy throughout the larger system.

Quite apart from Putnam’s studies, general analysis, and recommendations (many of which were challenged by scholars), of particular interest was the explosive reaction to his argument–and the reorientation of strategic concern it represented. The outpouring of interest his first rather academic article on the subject produced revealed that Putnam had struck a powerful nerve. “Seldom has a thesis moved so quickly from scholarly obscurity to conventional wisdom,” observed former White House aide and political scientist William Galston.

Especially important was what was not at the center of attention: Putnam and many who responded to him did not focus on national parties, national interest groups, national lobbying, national campaign finance laws, or national political phenomena in general. What he and they focused on was the “micro” level of citizen groups and citizen involvement. Here, at the very local level, was now the place to begin to look for democratic renewal.

The heart of the larger foundational argument–and this is a critical emphasis–might be put thus: Is it possible to have Democracy with a Big D in the system as a whole if you do not have real democracy with a small d at the level where people live, work, and raise families in their local communities? If the answer is no, then a necessary if not sufficient condition of rebuilding democracy in general is to get to work locally.

Putnam essentially put into modern form Tocqueville’s contention that “in democratic countries knowledge of how to combine is the mother of all other forms of knowledge.” There is also clearly a close connection between Nisbet-style “intermediate association” arguments for liberty and neo-Tocquevillian associational arguments for democracy.

But Tocqueville, in fact, had gone beyond “associations” to take up the deeper question of how–and whether–democratic practice is reflected not only in civil society, but in actual local government. “Municipal institutions,” he stressed, “constitute the strength of free nations. Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s reach, they teach men how to use and enjoy it.”

John Stuart Mill similarly held that direct experience with local governance was essential to “the peculiar training of a citizen, the practical part of the political education of a free people.” Mill pointed out that “we do not learn to read or write, to ride or swim, by being merely told how to do it, but by doing it, so it is only by practicing popular government on a limited scale, that the people will ever learn how to exercise it on a larger.”

Understood in this broader framework, Putnam’s thesis is only one of a group of arguments that focus primary attention on what goes on in local communities. Indeed, an important and expanding group of theorists have picked up on the more demanding “small d” Tocqueville-Mill argument that an authentic experience of participation in local government decision making is essential if democracy is to be meaningful. 


A forceful statement of the more fundamental judgment is that of political scientist Stephen Elkin, a theorist who stresses that citizens must experience the actual use of power: “Civic associations cannot do [this] job: The element of authority is missing.” Again, “for citizens to have any concern for the public interest . . . they must have the experience of grappling with its elements. For any significant number of citizens this can happen only through local political life.”

Other democratic theorists who urge reinvigorating democracy through a renewal of local governing institutions include Jane Mansbridge, Michael Sandel, and Benjamin Barber. Mansbridge argues that citizens are “most likely to come to understand their real interests in a small democracy, like a town or workplace, where members make a conscious effort to choose democratic procedures appropriate to the various issues that arise.” In his study, Democracy’s Discontent, Sandel holds that it is important to recover the meaning of the “republican tradition” in American political life–a tradition that “taught that to be free is to share in governing a political community that controls its own fate. Self-government . . . requires political communities that control their destinies, and citizens who identify sufficiently with those communities to think and act with a view to the common good.”

Barber’s treatise on Strong Democracy emphasizes the importance of different forms of knowledge to different degrees of democratic practice: “[K]nowing your rights and knowing the law are concomitants,” he suggests, “of minimalist or weak democratic politics.” Something far more powerful is needed–and this requires a very different understanding of how knowledge is acquired. “In the strong democratic perspective, knowledge and the quest for knowledge tend to follow rather than to precede political engagement: give people some significant power and they will quickly appreciate the need for knowledge, but foist knowledge on them without giving them responsibility and they will display only indifference.” It follows that “only direct political participation–activity that is explicitly public” can achieve real civic education in a democracy.

The necessity of an authentic experience of government has, of course, also been stressed over the years by numerous conservative theorists–and they, too, have consistently urged the importance of direct local involvement. Hayek speaks for many: “Nowhere has democracy ever worked well without a great measure of local self-government, providing a school of political training for the people at large . . . where responsibility can be learned and practiced in affairs with which most people are familiar, where it is the awareness of one’s neighbor rather than some theoretical knowledge of the needs of other people which guides action.”

The basic community-oriented emphasis can also be found in a line of arguments urging decentralization of government within large cities so as to increase opportunities for genuine participation. Early in the postwar era, philosopher Hannah Arendt (drawing on a Jeffersonian idea) suggested that “ward republics” be established at the neighborhood level. “It is futile,” urban theorist Jane Jacobs similarly urges, “to expect that citizens will act with responsibility, verve and experience on big, city-wide issues when self-government has been rendered all but impossible on localized issues, which are often of the most direct importance to people.” Jacobs, too, proposed transferring a number of municipal decisions to the level of neighborhood
districts.


There are also converging themes of community self-determination in the work of important black theorists: political scientist Phillip Thompson, for instance, draws on the earlier work of W. E. B. DuBois to argue, “Mass incarceration of black male youth, extensive state ‘therapeutic’ management of poor African American communities . . . make it clear that African American communities are in need of strong independent civic institutions capable of providing their own civic voice and social order in the face of extensive external corporate and governmental control.” (A number of specific proposals to undergird local organizations, neighborhood efforts, and broader public participation have been offered by different writers. In connection with their “associative democracy” approach, Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers have proposed devolution of certain public functions and financial assistance to citizen groups so that among other things they can become “more supportive of the range of egalitarian-democratic norms.” Jeremy Rifkin suggests public payment of a “social wage” for community-serving work in–and tax deductions for time contributed to–legally certified tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis have urged limited tax credits (rather than deductions) for contributions to nonprofit organizations.)

The argument that nurturing democracy with a small d is necessary if big-D Democracy in the system as a whole is ever to be renewed brings into sharp relief some of the real-world conditions required to make this meaningful. A central question concerns the economic underpinnings of local democracy. It is obvious, for instance, that active citizen participation in local community efforts is all but impossible if the economic rug is regularly pulled out from under them. What, precisely, is “the community” when citizens are forced to move in and out of specific geographic localities because of volatile local economic conditions? 


Who has any real stake in long-term decisions?

That a substantial degree of economic stability is one of the critical preconditions of local involvement is documented in several important studies. A recent analysis of the 2000 election by the U.S. Census Bureau demonstrates that “citizens who had lived in the same home for five or more years had a voting rate of 72 percent . . . ”–much higher than rates for individuals who had lived at their residences for a shorter time. Again, Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady have shown that “years in community” is a positive predictor of both national and local-level civic involvement, with the effect nearly twice as strong for local involvement. Another detailed survey of nearly thirty thousand Americans undertaken in 2000 similarly shows that years lived in one’s community and the expectation of staying in one’s community are correlated with increased civic participation.

A related issue involves the power relationships that set the terms of reference for municipal government. Numerous scholarly studies have demonstrated that local government decision making commonly is heavily dominated by the local business community. Commonly, too, the thrust of decisions favorable to business groups radically constrains all other choices. The use of scarce resources to develop downtown areas, and especially to attract or retain major corporations, inevitably absorbs funds that might alternatively be used to help low- and moderate-income neighborhood housing, schools, and community services.

The issue is not simply one of distribution. City Limits, an aptly titled study by Harvard political scientist Paul Peterson, demonstrates that as a result of the underlying relationships, policy choices are often “limited to those few which can plausibly be shown to be conducive to the community’s economic prosperity.” Partly this is because business owners have more money, hence usually more political influence. But quite apart from such considerations, local political leaders feel they must promote economic development, and they accordingly feel they need the help of the business community.

The “democracy with a small d” question is whether there can be any meaningful democratic decision making when allocations to achieve business priorities implicitly preempt alternative choices. If not–if most choices are radically hemmed in from the start by the need to be responsive to business–what is there to decide? And if there is little to decide, what is the meaning of democracy? And how, precisely, might the situation be altered, given the power of business interests in the system?


The conclusion–though not always brought into clear focus by theorists concerned with democracy and civil society–is inescapable: if the local foundations of democracy are to be meaningfully rebuilt, this also requires an approach to achieving greater local economic stability that does not rely so heavily on traditional business-oriented strategies. If municipalities are to be “delivered from their present economic bondage,” political scientist David Imbroscio observes, they must find ways “to promote economic vitality in their jurisdictions via the implementation of ‘alternative’ economic development strategies based on something other than capturing footloose investment.”

To the extent local economies can be made more stable, the economic environment in which local entrepreneurial businesses may flourish also obviously improves; hence, one of the foundational institutions of traditional conservative theories of liberty can also thereby be strengthened.

How to do this becomes the key question.

One method is obvious: as many have noted, cities anchored by universities, state capitals, and other major public facilities commonly enjoy greater economic stability. Economist Ann Markusen also points to many community-stabilizing policies that have been used to deal with dislocations associated with the Department of Defense base closings and related experience. Many experts–for instance, city planning professor Arthur C. Nelson, and sociologists John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotch–have proposed a range of “development-from-below” strategies. These include diverse education and training programs, and loan, tax, procurement, and other policies to encourage business retention, entrepreneurship, and neighborhood capital accumulation.

A more fundamental structural approach intersects with the asset-based strategies considered in my article “Equality,” published in the August issue of Empirical. An important feature of worker-owned firms is that they not only change the ownership of wealth but also are far more anchored in local communities by virtue of the simple fact that worker-owners live in the community. “The only real way a community can regain control over its economic future is to rebuild from the ground up,” urges Michael Shuman, the author of Going Local. Over the long haul, he adds, this can only be done by supporting the development of noncorporate “community-friendly” enterprises that have many integral links to the locality. Real community democracy, in short, requires real community economic health–and the kinds of institutions that can sustain it. But this is obviously only one element in a comprehensive approach.


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Thursday, December 27, 2012

January Excerpt: Democracy by Gar Alperovitz

Democracy: From The Ground Up
Gar Alperovitz 
Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
PHOTO: Tiffany Pan
Reprinted with permission by the author and the Democracy Collaborative. This article was originally published as Chapter Three in Gar Alperovitz, America Beyond Capitalism: Reclaiming Our Wealth, Our Liberty, and Our Democracy, 2nd Edition (Democracy Collaborative Press and Dollars and Sense, 2011).

What of the central question of democracy itself ? Many have noted the trends of failing belief, the radical decline in voting, the massive role of money and corporate influence in lobbying, media, and elections–and in general, the large numbers who surveys show feel that “our national experiment in self-government is faltering.” That millions of Americans believe “people like me have almost no say in the political system” has been a wake-up call for many on the left, right, and center. 

Several lines of reassessment have become increasingly important as the crisis has deepened. The first, directed to foundational “grassroots” community issues, has come into ever more sharply defined focus in recent years.

The work of Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam kicked off a major debate on one aspect of the problem.

Putnam probed well beneath such surface-level issues as the fall-off in voting to focus instead on local citizen associations, networks, formal and informal clubs, neighborhood groups, unions, and the like. Large numbers of Americans, he suggested, were now both actually and metaphorically “bowling alone” rather than in association with others. Putnam suggested that a decline in associational activity, in turn, had produced a decline in trust and “social capital”–foundational requirements of democracy in general. His response was straightforward: the nation should develop as many ways as possible to encourage local involvement–the only way, he held, Americans could hope to renew the basis of democracy throughout the larger system.

Quite apart from Putnam’s studies, general analysis, and recommendations (many of which were challenged by scholars), of particular interest was the explosive reaction to his argument–and the reorientation of strategic concern it represented. The outpouring of interest his first rather academic article on the subject produced revealed that Putnam had struck a powerful nerve. “Seldom has a thesis moved so quickly from scholarly obscurity to conventional wisdom,” observed former White House aide and political scientist William Galston.

Especially important was what was not at the center of attention: Putnam and many who responded to him did not focus on national parties, national interest groups, national lobbying, national campaign finance laws, or national political phenomena in general. What he and they focused on was the “micro” level of citizen groups and citizen involvement. Here, at the very local level, was now the place to begin to look for democratic renewal. The heart of the larger foundational argument–and this is a critical emphasis–might be put thus: Is it possible to have Democracy with a Big D in the system as a whole if you do not have real democracy with a small d at the level where people live, work, and raise families in their local communities? If the answer is no, then a necessary if not sufficient condition of rebuilding democracy in general is to get to work locally.



If you would like to read more from Gar Alperovitz's article in Empirical, the January issue is now available at your local bookstore. 


Wednesday, December 5, 2012

From the Empirical Archives: Money, Time, and Real Freedom by Gar Alperovitz


Money, Time, and Real Freedom 
Gar Alperovitz
Originally Published in Empirical magazine in June 2012


Two quite distinct trends have produced growing concern that the political-economic system no longer appears able to sustain a culture of liberty. The first and most obvious involves restrictions on individual liberties in response to terrorism and war, and in response to crime. The second, and more fundamental, relates to foundational issues involving the underlying structures and institutions of the political-economic system as a whole.

Our primary interest at this point is with foundational problems–the bedrock questions at the very heart of the system.

*

It is essential to understand the deep-seated nature of the problem confronting those concerned with liberty even, in the first instance, when approached from the perspective of the traditional (conservative) assumptions prominent in contemporary discourse. That a dead-end has been reached with virtually no way back to traditional approaches is painfully obvious to sophisticated thinkers. Indeed, in this respect thoughtful conservatives are in as much of a quandary as thoughtful liberals concerned with equality, the system-wide nature of the problems they face no different.

Traditional conservative approaches to liberty depend, foundationally, upon quite distinct institutional judgements: First, that “big government” must be reduced; second, that a free market capitalist economy must be protected and sustained both because it is held that free markets are important to liberty in general, and because it is held that they nurture the spirit of entrepreneurship and a culture of free individualism.

That “big government” is anathema to individual liberty is the fundamental structural argument of traditional theory. Ultimately, a reduction in government’s reach, scale, and function is the premise of all secondary arguments – the necessary condition which allows the citizenry to build a society capable of nurturing and sustaining liberty against its many challenges. All power corrupts, it is held – even (perhaps especially) benevolent power.

Despite President Bill Clinton’s assurance that the era of big government is over, the reality is that government in the United States is big – far bigger than most realize. Rhetoric aside, what is striking is that conservatives have simply been unable to alter the fundamental patterns and orders of magnitude:

Government grew from roughly 7% of the economy in 1902 to roughly 30% in 2002. By a more comprehensive measure the current figure is at least 35-36%, and some recent estimates of the impact of regulatory and other indirect activity add an additional 8%, bringing the total to 43-44% of the economy. (Milton Friedman believes the actual number is closer to 50%).

“I will do many things for my country,” columnist George Will lamented during the Reagan years, “but I will not pretend that the careers of, say, Ronald Reagan and Franklin Roosevelt involve serious philosophical differences.”

Richard Nixon left office with government more expansive than that left by Eisenhower; that of Reagan was larger than that of Nixon; government at the end the first Bush Presidency was larger than that of Reagan. And even before a major military build-up expanded the Federal budget there was little statistical evidence that George W. Bush would be able to more than marginally alter government’s overall scope and scale.4 Indeed, not only did government increase as a share of the economy during his first years in office but, much to the dismay of many conservatives, Bush pushed for $400 billion in new prescription drug spending in 2003.

It is not that conservatives have not tried – and still continue to try: A broad range of strategies have been attempted – including selective budget-cutting, balanced budgets laws, tax reduction designed to “starve government,” even attempts to amend the Constitution. Just as traditional liberal strategies may have slowed the trend of growing inequality (but failed to reverse the trend beyond temporary moments), so too the conservative approaches which have so angered liberals have altered priorities and cut back the growth of government. What they have not done is achieve any degree of significant alteration in government’s basic order of magnitude.

*

A cottage industry of political scientists has probed the institutional, constituency, organizational, and other reasons why government has grown, and why its core structures have been so unyielding. One group of scholars has argued that government grows because citizens oppose government in general, but want specific programs of interest to them in particular. Another group of theories derives from the work of the economist, the late Mancur Olson, and from related work by Anthony Downs, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. This emphasizes that special interests have large incentives to secure government benefits – and also have the power to organize to gain their objectives. Even though greater numbers in the public may pay the costs, it is difficult and expensive to organize them since few individuals have enough incentive to participate effectively.

Still another theory is that of political-economist Robert Higgs, who argues that a series of crises – World War I, the Great Depression, World War II – have been exploited in ways which not only expand government, but lead to a “ratcheting” upward of government’s scope and scale. Once expanded in the context of crisis, constituencies develop around programs and make it impossible to reverse the now upwardly “ratcheted” new levels.

Whatever theory or theories in the end prove to offer the most accurate explanation, the bottom line is that there are powerful reasons why very little structural or trend change has occurred–even when conservatives have been elected to office. When the smoke screen of rhetoric attacking big government is pierced we can understand why the chief architect of the ‘Reagan Revolution,’ Budget Bureau Director David Stockman, left office convinced that real change was “impossible.” Or why conservative economist Milton Friedman might lament: “We have been, despite some successes, mostly on the losing side.”

*

Similar problems confront the argument that individual liberty also depends, foundationally, on maintaining the underlying institutions of free market capitalism–especially the independence and energy of the entrepreneur. Although it is also held that a thorough-going entrepreneurial economy is required to disperse power and nurture a culture of liberty, giant corporations now control such key industries as energy, telecommunications, steel, autos, home appliances, many food products, etc. Simply by way of illustration:

General Electric, Whirlpool, and Maytag sell 80% of all ovens and 85% of all dryers; Proctor & Gamble, Unilever, Colgate-Palmolive, and Dial account for 83% of bar soap sold in the United States. Three companies dominate 60-66% of the cable television, online job recruitment and college text book markets. Two companies control 75% of the soft drink market.


Globally a mere three hundred multinational corporations account for an estimated 25 percent of productive assets. “The sales of General Motors and Ford,” Noreena Hertz of Cambridge University observes, “are greater than the GDP of the whole of sub-Saharan Africa; the assets of IBM, BP and General Electric outstrip the economic capabilities of most small nations; and Wal-Mart, the US supermarket retailer, has higher revenues than most Central and Eastern European states including Poland, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.”

Nor, as traditional theory assumes, do such firms avoid government. Richard Nixon’s Secretary of the Treasury, the late William Simon, recalled how during his “tenure at Treasury I watched with incredulity as businessmen ran to the government in every crisis, whining for handouts or protection from the very competition that has made this system so productive...”

I saw Texas ranchers, hit by drought, demanding
government-guaranteed loans; giant milk
cooperatives lobbying for higher price supports;
major airlines fighting deregulation to preserve
their monopoly status; giant companies like
Lockheed seeking federal assistance to rescue
them from sheer inefficiency; bankers, like David
Rockefeller, demanding government bailouts
to protect them from their ill-conceived
investments; network executives, like William
Paley of CBS, fighting to preserve regulatory
restrictions and to block the emergence of competitive
cable and pay TV.


“And always, such gentlemen proclaimed their devotion to free enterprise and their opposition to the arbitrary intervention into our economic life by the state. Except, of course, for their own case, which was always unique and which was justified by their immense concern for the public interest.”

Traditional conservatives, like the founder of the University of Chicago freemarket school of economics, Henry C. Simons, begged fellow conservatives to recognize that “[t]urned loose with inordinate powers, corporations have vastly overorganized most industries.” Indeed, this highly respected conservative (and Milton Friedman’s revered teacher) held that “America might now be better off if the corporate form had never been invented or never made available to private enterprise.”

Another leading conservative, Friedrich A. Hayek, years ago urged that “if we continue on the path we have been treading [toward what he termed the “monopolistic organization of industry” closely allied with government], it will lead us to totalitarianism.”

*

The traditional response to the reality of corporate power has been an anti-trust effort to break up giant firms. But few any longer believe the kind of economy which undergirds the traditional theory can be restored by such means. An occasional anti-trust battle has been won, but in the more than one hundred years since the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was enacted there have only been a handful of successful challenges to major corporations. Commonly, even when large corporations have lost legal battles–as in the recent Microsoft case – they have been able to hire top legal teams and use delaying tactics until a new Administration comes to power or until technological advantage has given them de facto control of the economic landscape of concern.

Even in the few cases where anti-trust has succeeded, the understanding of additional conservatism that corporate power threatens values of liberty and democracy has all but disappeared. In the modern era, anti trust discussions are narrowly focused on technical economic matters and complex (and debatable) measurements of the potential impact on consumers. William Safire is one of the few to stress what was once self-evident to fellow conservatives:

With the round-heeled Michael Powell steering
the Federal Communications Commission
toward terminal fecklessness; with the redoubtable
Joel Klein succeeded at Justice’s antitrust
division by an assortment of wimps; and with
appeals courts approving the concentration of
media power as if nothing had changed since
President Taft’s day, the checks and balances
made possible by diverse competition are being
eradicated.

“The longtime anti-business coloration of liberals reduces their ability to take on the convergence con. It is for conservatives to ask ourselves: Since when is bigness goodness?”

The power implications of the giant corporation are one thing. Equally important is the indirect cultural and human impact of the historic shift away from entrepreneurial capitalism. “Dependence,” Thomas Jefferson urged, “begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue...” Jefferson held that only under conditions of widespread small scale individual property ownership could a people “safely and advantageously reserve to themselves a wholesome control over their public affairs.”

A hundred years later Woodrow Wilson warned that if America’s children in future were to “open their eyes in a country where they must be employees or nothing ... then they will see an America as the founders of this Republic would have wept to think of.” Louis Brandeis asked: “Can any man be really free who is constantly in danger of becoming dependent for mere subsistence upon somebody and something else than his own exertion and conduct?”

That a nation in which nine out of ten people are ‘employees’ is radically different, culturally, from a nation of entrepreneurs – and that the problems this raises for liberty must also be confronted – is something very few conservatives have even been willing to discuss in recent years. They have mainly looked away from what was once a central element in their philosophical stance – perhaps because the implications are so difficult to accept.

*

For these many reasons, viewed in broadest historical perspective (and whether one agrees or disagrees with them) such traditional theories of liberty increasingly appear as walking intellectual corpses – ideas which for better or worse no longer have much structural relationship to the living realities of the modern political economic world. Philosophical conservatives have developed wonderfully coherent abstract theories based on assumed first premises – but the premises commonly sidestep the hard problems defined by the long, unyielding real world structures and trends. (None of this, of course, has prevented politicians from continuing to hammer away at traditional ideological themes to rally support for favored policies.)

If even from within the perspective of traditional conservatism what have been understood as the institutional foundations of liberty no longer seem achievable in the real world, are there any strategic approaches which might one day come to terms with the underlying foundational issues?


One modern line of attack stems from the work of the late Robert Nisbet, a highly regarded conservative sociologist. Broadly speaking, traditional theories involve an implicit balance of power conception. On the one hand, liberty can be enhanced by weakening the state; on the other, it can be enhanced by protecting or bolstering the position of the individual (by, for instance, encouraging an entrepreneurial economy). A critical – indeed, absolutely essential – way to support the individual, Nisbet held, is to nurture the kinds of “intermediate institutions” which stand between the lone individual and the state, thereby providing both social support and a buffer against centralized power.

The rise of fascism before and during World War II, Nisbet contended, demonstrated that isolated individuals were psychologically and politically vulnerable to the appeals of powerful leaders like Hitler: “Only in their social interdependence are men given to resist the tyranny that always threatens to arise out of any political government, democratic or other.” A decline in the importance of churches, unions, and various local and neighborhood civic associations had been disastrous. Planning and an all-out effort to nurture the conditions which support such institutions, Nisbet urged, was therefore required to protect individuals against the claims of centralized power.

Peter Berger, William Schambra, and several other writers have offered variations on this basic theme in recent years. The concept of “mediating structures,” Berger urges, is “politically promising. It cuts across the ideological divides...” and offers ways to transcend the dangers of a world characterized by the “‘liquid molecules’ of individuals caught in a chaotic private world, and the leveling tyranny of the totalitarian state.”

The argument intersects with the similar but slightly different argument that democracy (not liberty) requires nurturing local citizen associations. And in both cases – as Nisbet’s general contention suggests – the argument leads to the question of how the underpinnings of the local context in which individuals and associations flourish or fail can be made secure.

A very different strategy aimed at bolstering the individual side of the state individual balance has been offered by the well-known management consultant, Peter Drucker – one of the very few who has been willing to confront the implications of the trend which has transformed entrepreneurs into employees.

Drucker suggests that the only way to establish the kind of stability and security once theoretically offered by individual entrepreneurial property is through government policies which achieve the “evolution of jobs into a kind of property.” This requires that there be no “‘expropriation [of the job] without compensation,’ and that employers take responsibility to anticipate redundancies, retraining employees... and finding and placing them in new jobs.” What is needed is “redundancy planning rather than unemployment compensation.”

A similar, even more sharply focused extension of the argument that jobs must be made secure – even a matter of legal right! – was included in early drafts of the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act. And, of course, the idea that real liberty requires job security is at the heart of most academic freedom arguments urged in defense of tenure arrangements common among college professors: Without a secure place to stand it is very difficult to achieve the independence which liberty urges as a central value.

Finally, such arguments and strategies, of course, also speak to the concern urged by scholars like Edward Luttwak that economic insecurities generated by “turbo-capitalism” are ultimately responsible for a liberty destroying culture which “vents its anger and resentment by punishing, restricting and prohibiting all that can be punished, restricted and prohibited.”

*

Traditional conservative premises have also been challenged in other ways. Political theorist Alan Ryan points out that there “have been many societies in which private property was taken seriously and political liberty was almost wholly absent.” After all, he and others note, all the fascist systems we know of were built upon and grew out of what had previously been free market capitalist foundations.

Again, in a recent book Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein stress that without effective and, indeed, costly government programs Americans “would enjoy few or none of their constitutionally guaranteed individual rights. Personal liberty, as Americans value and experience it, presupposes social cooperation managed by government officials. The private realm we rightly prize is sustained, indeed created, by public action.”

For the most part, liberals who have confronted the foundational issue have focused on how the conditions which define the real world situation facing the individual can be altered so as to increase freedom of action and the power to choose. One major line of thought emphasizes questions of time: Individual liberty can obviously never be fully realized if men and women must work devastatingly long hours simply to feed and shelter their families.

Only if an individual has time which she can dispose of freely as she sees fit can liberty be truly meaningful.

Walter Lippman held that free time was “the substance of liberty, the material of free will.” John Maynard Keynes looked forward to an era (“much sooner perhaps than we are all of us aware of ”) when a reduction of working hours would confront man “with his real, his permanent problem – how to use his freedom... .” Herbert Marcuse judged “the reduction of the working day to a point where the mere quantum of labor time no longer arrests human development is the first prerequisite for freedom.”

The reality, however, is that the political-economic trend which reduced the workweek from more than 70 hours at the end of the 19th century to roughly 40 hours today has been essentially stalled for almost 50 years. Writers like economist Juliet Schor, historian Benjamin Hunnicutt, and philosopher Jerome Segal have suggested that the productivity gains offered by modern technological development offer radically new possibilities for the expansion of free time as a foundation for individual liberty and freedom of choice. They have also begun to propose strategies to encourage a resumption of the previously downward-moving trend over the course of the 21st century.29

One commonly urged approach would strengthen and revise current “40 hour a week” laws limiting full-time work and regulating overtime pay.

Segal proposes that public policy should ultimately aim to reduce the work-week to 25 hours–and that the additional money needed to maintain basic needs be provided by an expanded form of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) which currently provides a wage supplement for low income working families.


Other answers to the underlying question have been proposed by political theorists like Bill Jordon and Philippe Van Parijs, and Yale Law Professor Anne Alstott. All have argued in general that a publicly guaranteed floor level amount of income (beyond mere subsistence) is essential if liberty is to have meaning in the modern era. Van Parijs, whose work has been at the center of discussion here and in Europe, holds: “If we are serious about pursuing real-freedom-for-all... what we have to go for is the highest unconditional income for all consistent with security and self-ownership.”

Significantly, the conservative Nobel Laureate, James Buchanan, also urges a “demogrant” form of basic income given equally to all (and financed by a flat tax). For many years Milton Friedman has also consistently urged the importance of a “negative” income tax involving cash supplements to low paid workers–the underlying principle of which has been enacted on a bipartisan basis in the form of the Earned Income Tax Credit.

*

Historian Eric Foner reminds us that during the early years of the Republic the central focus of debate was not simply “liberty,” but “equal liberty” – an idea which also reaches beyond legal and Constitutional protections to consider the capacities and real world conditions of the vast majority. “Even a conservative like John Adams, who distrusted the era’s democratic pretensions,” Foner observes, believed this required enabling “every member of society” to acquire land. Tocqueville put it this way: “[N]othing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of condition among the people...”

[T]he more I advanced in the study of American
society, the more I perceived that this
equality of condition is the fundamental fact
from which all others seem to be derived and
the central point at which all my observations
constantly terminated.

A final group of theorists has returned to the question of “equality of condition” in the search for strategies to nurture liberty by bolstering the position and capacities of the individual. Most have also built upon John Dewey’s argument that “effective freedom” is radically different from the “highly formal and limited concept of liberty.” It requires “effective power to do specific things.” Thus Washington Post columnist E. J. Dionne states: “To be the master of one’s own fate – a fair definition of liberty – means not simply being free from overt coercion (though that is a precondition); it also involves being given the means to overcome various external forces that impinge on freedom of choice and self-sufficiency. It means being free to set one’s course...”

Similarly, Alan Ryan writes: Most people understand that freedom “involves the expansion of our options...” “‘Freedom of choice’ implies a wide range of options...” The full implications of the argument have been developed by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen in work outlining the “capabilities” and “outcomes” needed to make freedom real. “Capability is... the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the freedom to achieve various life styles).”

All arguments which focus on the importance of ‘equality of liberty,’ of course, bring with them a series of proposals for improving the education, health, and economic conditions of those whose capacities for choice are limited by the way in which economic and other resources are currently allocated.

*

Broadly speaking, emerging modern theories of liberty converge on three central propositions:

First, liberty requires institutional and structural support for individual economic security to replace that which at least in theory was once provided by entrepreneurial property. Second, it requires support for the community-wide conditions needed to nurture the intermediate associations and civil society organizations which are essential to sustaining a culture supportive of liberty. Third, it requires greater amounts of equitably distributed free time (without which little real freedom of choice is possible) and support for individual development (without which the capacities needed to exercise real freedom must inevitably be limited).




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